SOME COMMON CONCERNS

Imagining BP's Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Pipelines System

SUMMARY REPORT

This is a study of a system of oil and gas pipelines that hasn't yet been built. The pipelines system's backers intend to build the pipelines through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey between early 2003 and late 2005.

The project comprises two pipelines, one oil and one gas, both starting near Baku in Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea and passing through Tbilisi in Georgia. The oil pipeline would run to Ceyhan in Turkey on the Mediterranean Sea, while the gas pipeline would run to Erzurum in eastern Turkey.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline is being promoted by a Sponsor Group, a consortium of oil companies led by BP. The South Caucasus (gas) Pipeline (SCP) (also known as the Shah Deniz pipeline, or Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) is being promoted by a slightly different (though overlapping) consortium of oil companies, also led by BP.

On top of these two pipelines, there are oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea, undersea pipes to the shore, a terminal for landing the oil, a set of pumping stations and a terminal for loading the oil onto tankers near Ceyhan.

We refer to this complete system as the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey pipelines system – AGT for short.

This is the summary report of the book 'Some Common Concerns', published in September 2002 by PLATFORM, The Corner House, Friends of the Earth International, Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale, CEE Bankwatch Network and The Kurdish Human Rights Project.

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The story that BP does not tell

As this report goes to print in summer 2002, the AGT pipelines project is entering its final consultation phase. This consultation phase is planned to close with the decision, in spring 2003, by international financial institutions (such as the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank, and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development) of whether to invest public money in the project.

The consultation – along with the statutory Environmental & Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs – which will be finalised in September 2002) – has been managed not by project leader BP, but by its contractors ERM (Environmental Resources Management) and URS. To facilitate their assessments in Azerbaijan, ERM produced a leaflet in Azerbaijani, English and Russian and have distributed it among some of the communities through which the proposed pipelines may pass. The leaflet briefly describes the pipelines project and points to some of the impacts it may have on local people. The impacts it lists as Some Common Concerns are as follows:

Will the project be safe? *Yes. The pipeline and all facilities will be built to the highest international standards, and will pose no threat to nearby residents.*

What will it mean to live near a worker camp? *There are likely to be a number of camps in Azerbaijan which will house the workforce during the construction period. Communities near potential camp locations are presently being consulted. While spending in the community will bring benefits, strict discipline will ensure that disturbance to local populations is minimised.*

Will we see a growth in traffic? *It is likely that areas near to camps or pipe yards, and their connecting roads, will experience a significant increase in traffic flows. To deal with this issue, traffic management plans will be developed to avoid congestion and maximise safety. BP puts safety before profit, and is therefore serious about this issue.*

Will local people benefit? *Yes. There will be some employment opportunities within construction teams and construction camps. In addition, local communities will benefit through the provision of services to construction teams*

The leaflet will have been the first direct, tangible information that local people in Azerbaijan have received about the proposed pipelines. What is remarkable about the leaflet is not what it says, but what it does not say. The list of "Some Common Concerns" above does not address many of the fundamental issues of concern about the pipelines system.

The proposed pipelines system

If the AGT pipelines system goes ahead as planned, it would be a vast social and industrial structure, a gathering of men, women and machines stretching 1,750 kilometres (1,087 miles) across hills and valleys, mountains and plains, fields and deserts, gardens and rivers that would remain in place for more than 40 years. The pipelines would be part of a complete system running from the offshore oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea to a tanker terminal on the Mediterranean coast. Through the pipelines would flow US$ 21 million worth of fuel every day.

The Chirag-1 oil platform, the first development of the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oilfields (G Ruschendorf / Rapho / Network)

This massive system does not yet exist. Like all pipelines systems, if it is built, it would go through four phases that will stretch over more than 50 years: pre-construction, construction, operation and post-operation. At the moment, the pipelines system is in the pre-construction phase: it exists only in the imagination of the companies and governments that are backing it. Many of the individuals who have the greatest oversight of the pipelines system work far away from the Caspian Sea in cities such as London, New York and Washington, DC. But it is extremely difficult to imagine what the pipelines will be like, and the effects they will have over at least the next two generations. We want to assist in this process of imagination by asking and trying to answer some more questions.

What events lie behind the leaflet and the proposed pipelines system?

On 20th September 1994, BP, Statoil, Amoco and other oil companies signed 'The Contract of the Century' with Azerbaijan. The contract gave the companies the rights to develop the offshore Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli oil fields but its details have never been released to the general public. The contract was the culmination of five years of planning, lobbying and negotiating by Western oil companies, a process that started in the last years of the Soviet Union.

Throughout the 1990s, the United States and United Kingdom governments in particular worked hard to build a strategic alliance with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in order to gain secure Western access to the vast oil and gas reserves of the Caspian region. These Caspian states are keen to break away from the Russian sphere of influence, while the West is keen to weaken Russia's 200-year hold over the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Key to this strategy is the choice of exit route for the majority of the Caspian oil (and less so, gas). If this is not to be through Russia, then it would have to run through one of four other countries: Iran, Afghanistan, China or Turkey. The Iranian route is politically unacceptable to the USA; Afghanistan remains unstable; and the route through China is too complex and expensive. This leaves Turkey and thus yields the BTC oil pipeline, and the AGT pipelines system as a whole.

The BTC/AGT option was first proposed in 1992. But the oil companies long held that this route would be uneconomic. In November 1999, US President Bill Clinton oversaw the signing of an accord on the oil pipeline between Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Turkey. Only at this point did BP come out in support of BTC. Since then, the oil companies and sponsor states have been negotiating hard to bring the pipelines into reality.

People living on the route of the proposed pipeline in Shahliq (central Azerbaijan) (Yury Urbansky/CEE Bankwatch)

Only after nearly 10 years of developing the plans for the pipelines system, and as the pre-construction phase was drawing to a close, were the communities along its proposed routes consulted. There is a vast momentum behind the project. The institutions behind the pipelines system want to begin construction in early 2003 and to start pumping oil and gas through the system in 2005.

What institutions lie behind the proposed pipelines system?

BP has 90 years of experience in planning, building and operating pipelines and currently owns pipeline systems in at least 10 countries. This experience informs the company's imagination of what the AGT pipelines system may be like; indeed, individuals such as John Browne (Chief Executive of BP) and David Woodward (President of BP Azerbaijan) have personal experience of several pipelines.

BP's change of heart in the late 1990s over the viability of the BTC pipeline, and the AGT pipelines system, has much to do with the changing fortunes of the corporation. BP was established at the beginning of the 20th century as effectively the fuelling arm of the British Royal Navy. It was 51% owned by the British state until 1976, when the British government began to sell off its controlling stake (the final portion, of 1.8%, was sold in 1995). Over the past 25 years, BP has searched for a role for itself outside the shadow of Britain's imperial past.

A key moment in its evolution was the merger with US oil major Amoco, which was announced in August 1998 and completed in January 1999. With this merger and the subsequent take-over of another US oil company, ARCO, which was completed in April 2000, BP effectively became a UK-US company. This meant that carrying out projects that would win the favour of the US government became increasingly important, and the AGT pipelines system is a project of extreme geographical importance to the USA. A good illustration of this relationship lies in BP's refinery at Mersin, near the end of the proposed BTC oil pipeline in southern Turkey. This refinery supplies aviation fuel to the air base at Incirlik, from which US bombing raids over Iraq and Afghanistan take off. Is BP now becoming the fuelling arm of the US Air Force?

Throughout the 1990s, the Caspian states such as Azerbaijan struggled to gain favourable terms from foreign oil companies for the development of their resources. To do so, they tried to play one corporation off against another. When the two largest players, BP and Amoco, merged, however, this advantage was largely lost. Since 1998, BP has been the primary player in the western Caspian region. It has a 34.1 % holding in the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (the company developing the majority of Azerbaijan's oil and gas fields), a 25.5% holding in the SCP (gas) pipeline and a 34.76 % holding in the BTC oil pipeline. It is also the operator of the complete AGT pipelines system, which is in effect a BP pipelines system.

How does Environmental Resources Management fit in?

BP is the lead company in AGT, but it does not act alone. Fourteen other oil companies have key holdings in the various elements of the complete system: SOCAR (the state oil company of Azerbaijan), Statoil of Norway, TotalFinaElf of France, Unocal of the USA, TPAO of Turkey, ENI of Italy, Itochu of Japan, Delta Hess of Saudi Arabia,ExxonMobil of the USA,Agip of Italy, Lukoil of Russia, OICE of Iran, Pennzoil of the USA, and Botaş of Turkey.

This wide range of international companies reflects the geopolitical significance of the Azerbaijani oil and gas fields and the great political pressure for the AGT pipelines system to be built.

To carry out its plans, BP, as leader of the consortia, regularly sub-contracts key elements to other companies. For example, financial advice for the BTC pipeline comes from investment bank Lazard Brothers of London while engineering management comes from Bechtel of San Francisco.

Thus ERM of London, in conjunction with URS of the USA, plus five local companies – Synergetics and AETC in Azerbaijan, Gorbi in Georgia and Kora and Envy in Turkey – has been conducting the Environmental and Social Impact Assessments of the pipelines on behalf of BP.

Bakuriani town, southern Georgia (Karen Decker/Bank Information Center)

BP intends that the US$ 3.3 billion BTC pipeline should be part financed (30%) from the resources of the companies involved but primarily financed (70%) from loans provided by banks – including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development based in London and the International Finance Corporation (part of the World Bank) based in Washington. Investment guarantees and export credits (government-backed insurance to companies against defaults on payment) are also expected from various national export credit agencies (ECAs) and from the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The banks and ECAs would give financial support from funds generated from public money – in effect, from European and US

taxpayers' money. In November 1988, BP boss John Browne stated that the BTC/AGT project would not be possible unless "' free public money' was offered by government to build the line."

It is this web of companies, institutions and states that is driving the AGT project forward. Many of the individual players, however, may not in fact have a comprehensive overview of the project, nor are they encouraged to think about the wider impacts if the project goes ahead and about their responsibility for these impacts.

Some people say that Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey would benefit. Is this true?

Azerbaijan – like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan which may use the AGT pipelines system to transport their resources to Western markets – regards the projected oil and gas revenues as a source of great future prosperity. These riches are projected to come to the governments in the form of taxes on the profits of the foreign oil companies, royalties on the resources they extract, and a share of the resources themselves. In Azerbaijan for example, oil-related revenues currently make up about 50% of the government's annual revenues. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey all hope for substantial incomes from transit payments for pumping oil and gas in pipelines through their countries.

Yet BP's practice in other countries casts doubt on the extent to which the host governments will benefit from the AGT pipelines system.

Head of BP John Browne made his name on the Forties Pipeline System in the North Sea, coming to prominence in the1980s by skilfully enabling BP to reduce its tax payment to the UK government. Throughout the last 30 years of the Forties pipeline, BP has continually lobbied UK governments to lower the tax on UK North Sea oil extraction. Today, the North Sea has the lowest taxation of any oil province in the world: royalties and petroleum revenue tax were abolished for all fields developed after 1982 and 1993 respectively. BP followed the same pattern of driving down taxes, and thereby depriving the host states of revenue, in Alaska and Colombia. In the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), BP was found several times (including in two court cases where BP settled out of court) to have overcharged transport fees and underpaid royalties through inaccurate accounting. In the OCENSA pipeline in Colombia, BP has repeatedly threatened to disinvest from the country so as to improve its contract terms, and it succeeded in obtaining a reduction of the state share of production from 50% to 30%.

From BP's point of view, much of the pre-construction phase of the AGT pipelines system has involved persuading the Azerbaijani, Georgian and Turkish governments to lower the taxes they wish to impose on the project. Indeed, BP's withholding of a commitment to the BTC oil pipeline up until late 1999 was linked to the effort to drive down payments to the host governments for the pipelines system. And not only have the governments' incomes been forced down, Turkey has guaranteed the construction cost for its section of the BTC pipeline - in effect writing a blank cheque which could amount to billions of dollars, to cover delays and overspends.

There is no reason to suppose that BP will not keep pressurising the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey throughout the lifetime of the project – the next 40 years or more – to reduce taxes on AGT, just as it has on its other pipeline systems. Georgian, Turkish and especially Azerbaijani hopes for prosperity need to be considered with this in mind.

Would people living along the AGT pipelines system benefit?

House in the Moravia barrio *in Medellín – built on a rubbish dump – where some of the families displaced by the OCENSA pipeline are now living (Michael Gillard)*

As with host states, it is instructive to look at how *communities* have fared in BP's other pipelines. Between 1995 and 1996, during the pre-construction and construction phases of the 837 kilometre (520 mile) OCENSA oil pipeline in Colombia, BP negotiated compensation packages with the peasants across whose smallholdings the pipeline passes. Compensation was offered for a strip of farmland just 12.5 metres (41 feet) wide. But soil erosion caused by the pipeline construction blocked springs and diverted streams, rendering land infertile. The military imposed a civilian-free corridor and a curfew along parts of the pipeline which blocked locals' access to their land and, for some, their homes. As a result of the environmental damage and the security presence,a corridor of up to 200 metres wide has in fact been taken away from landowners. Overall, instead of having a narrow strip of land temporarily disturbed by construction, some peasants have lost the use of their entire holdings, have left their homes and drifted to the outskirts of the city of Medellín where they are now living in dire poverty.

Today, six years after the construction of the OCENSA pipeline, lawyers working on behalf of 200 families are still trying to get compensation from BP for this disruption of their lives and communities. BP's attitude is that the issues should be resolved by the courts, even though the communities involved have scant resources to put into a legal case.

The experience of this pipeline informs BP's imagination of a pipeline system such as AGT.

The leaflet that ERM prepared for the communities in Azerbaijan living along the proposed AGT pipeline route proclaims the benefits to local people of employment during construction. It makes no mention, however, of the possible long-term dis-benefits, such as those that the farmers in Zaragoza and Segovia provinces of Colombia are experiencing.

A final irony is that huge amounts of oil and gas would flow through the AGT pipelines but the areas through which they would pass are fuel poor. Although communities in Azerbaijan used to

have electricity under the Soviet system, they now lack secure supplies of energy. In Georgia, only 10% of communities along the AGT route regularly receive piped gas.

What sort of disturbance would there be during construction of the AGT pipelines system?

The ERM-prepared leaflet for the Azerbaijan communities raises only 'technical' problems – problems that it claims can be reduced through BP's policies, techniques and technologies. Some disturbance, however, is an unavoidable part of such a large project, as was the case, for example, when BP built the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) in the United States. Much of the disturbance caused by the construction of TAPS arose from the sudden arrival in the region of 28,000 young men to build it, many of them working on short-term contracts. Alaskan journalist and author John Strohmeyer describes its construction as follows:

Scar left by the East Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (NGP) near Erzurum, north-eastern Turkey. The BTC pipeline would run alongside the NGP for 40% of its length in Turkey, between Erzurum and Sivas. (Greg Muttitt, PLATFORM)

> *"Everything was geared to speed… [The company] was prepared to accept higher construction costs at any time the alternative meant delay. Every day lost meant the sacrifice of profits from 660,000 barrels of oil, which was the estimated daily flow at start up. No one attempted to peg the precise figure. It was impressive enough to say that at [US] $10 a barrel, oil companies would be giving up $6.6 million of income a day".*

The pressure to complete AGT – the projected income of which is US$ 21 million a day, – is likely to be just as intense. Meanwhile, the arrival of thousands of men and machines in the region would inevitably cause physical damage to roads, water systems and land, and social and economic damage to communities.

Would the AGT pipelines system exacerbate conflict?

The regions through which the AGT pipelines system would pass are subject to several existing, or potential, violent conflicts. These are not mentioned in the ERM-prepared leaflet – but they are likely to be immensely significant in the lives of those living along the pipelines, if they are constructed.

Although the AGT pipelines system would only skirt the predominantly Kurdish regions of south-eastern Turkey, it would pass through areas of north-eastern Turkey where Kurds make up around 40 per cent of the population. In these areas, the Turkish State has been at war with much of the local people for many years, committing human rights abuses, and harassing and imprisoning elected Kurdish officials, and through many majority Kurdish villages. The AGT pipelines would require a continuous militarised corridor which would undoubtedly threaten the existing fragile cease-fire between Turkey and Kurdish groups. Elsewhere, a pipelines system with such great strategic importance as AGT may re-ignite conflicts such as that between Azerbaijan and Armenia from 1988 to 1994, which created nearly a million refugees and left at least 25,000 dead. The inevitable militarisation of AGT can be foreseen in the boasts made by the presidents of Georgia and Azerbaijan that they will devote substantial military resources to protection of the pipelines.

The impacts of such militarisation on the everyday lives of those who would live along the AGT pipelines, if they are constructed, may be imagined by looking at the experience of local people impacted by BP's OCENSA pipeline in Colombia, a country that has for several decades been divided by civil war. Here, the safety of the pipeline was not so much a matter of engineering as one of politics, militarisation and conflict.

Throughout the 1990s, BP produced oil and gas, and constructed pipelines and other facilities in Colombia. The OCENSA pipeline has been at been at the centre of horrific human rights abuses, including assassinations, beatings and disappearances. These have been carried out by the Colombian army, with which BP has a close relationship, and paramilitary groups, which the army mostly condones. BP has provided equipment and funds to the army to defend its pipeline. According to an investigation by the British national newspaper *The Guardian* BP's security contractors have been accused of training Colombian police in lethal operations and of passing to the army details of local peasant and union campaigners, many of whom have later been targeted. BP denies both charges.

In June 1996, Marcos Mendoza, who had participated in a protest against BP that involved stopping work on the pipeline, was shot dead at his home by the Colombian army. Carlos Arriguí Cerquera, President of the Asociación Departmental de Usuarios Campesinos (the smallholders association in the oil fields region of Casanare) and leader of the January 1994 work stoppage, was also assassinated. BP was not directly responsible, although the paramilitary groups who are the likely culprits are known to target anyone who criticises the oil companies.

The pipeline itself has been frequently attacked by guerrilla groups. In October 1998, for instance, the ELN guerrilla group blew up BP's OCENSA pipeline at the village of Machuca in the state of Antioquia, Colombia. The resulting fireball killed at least 70 people. One survivor described a 50-metre ball of flame roaring along a river before hitting the village, where it engulfed wooden homes in which villagers were sleeping.

BP and its partner companies predicted even before they had built the pipeline that it would be attacked. They would have been aware, therefore, of at least some of the potential impact of increased militarisation along the pipeline. British development agencies Oxfam and Save the Children Fund argue that BP's presence has exacerbated tensions, violence and poverty.

Under the shadow of war and continuing human rights abuses, is it possible for all local people living along the proposed route of the AGT pipelines to be fairly consulted as part of the

Environmental and Social Impact Assessment studies for which the ERM-prepared leaflet was produced? And what would life be like for them in militarised corridors that would 'protect' the pipelines, should they be constructed?

How safe would the AGT pipelines system be for the environment?

The BTC and SCP pipelines need to be seen as part of a complete system that stretches from offshore oil platform to tanker terminal. Just one failure in any part of the system could have enormous environmental consequences.

In Alaska, for example, on the night of 24th March 1989,the *Exxon Valdez* oil tanker ran aground in Prince William Sound spilling 258,000 barrels of crude oil and creating one of the world's worst environmental disasters. The tanker was just one element of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) which extracts oil in the fields of Alaska's North Slope, pumps it along the pipeline and loads it from the Valdez terminal onto tankers such as the *Exxon Valdez* , which then carry it down to the West Coast of the United States to be refined. Another oil company, Exxon, was responsible for the tanker in this disaster, but the terminal at Valdez was run by Alyeska – the Trans-Alaska pipeline consortium led by BP – which thus had responsibility for preventing spills and being prepared in case they did occur. And the spill became a disaster largely as a result of Alyeska's negligence.

The Exxon Valdez *grounded on Bligh Reef, Prince William Sound, March 1989 (The Office of Response and Restoration, National Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)*

The disaster was not a one-off occurrence. It was a consequence of the companies behind the pipeline consistently cutting safety standards over three decades in order to save money. Workers and journalists who have tried to raise safety issues have been harassed, sacked from their jobs, and subject to surveillance.

If the BTC oil pipeline were built, it would deliver one million barrels of crude oil per day to the tanker terminal at Yumurtalik, just south of Ceyhan on Turkey's Mediterranean coast. To transport this crude oil to Western Europe may require nearly 1,000 tanker shipments per year, totalling perhaps 40,000 shipments in BTC's lifetime. Each of these shipments would pose a threat to the ecology and beauty of Turkey's Turquoise Coast. If the pipeline is built, how safe would the flora and fauna of this coast be, and the valleys and forests through which it would pass, for the next half century? What are the risks for fishing or tourism in the region? And what of the risks of fractures along the pipeline route, which passes through earthquake zones?

How safe would the AGT pipelines system be for those who operate it?

The best clues as to probable worker safety on the AGT pipelines system, if it is built, are in BP's safety record elsewhere. Another complete pipeline system – the Forties Pipeline System (FPS), comprising North Sea oilfields, a sea and land pipeline, and a refinery at Grangemouth in Scotland, all operated by BP– should provide some of these.

Despite Britain having relatively strict health and safety legislation, and a critical media and political culture, Grangemouth refinery and the offshore oil installations have had a litany of safety disasters. In 1990, for example, two explosions within 10 days at Grangemouth killed three workers. In July 2000, evacuation alarms failed to go off when explosive gas leaked around the plant. The fire was the seventh safety incident in the space of a year. One contractor said, "The workmen don't have any confidence in the safety of this site." Several workers required trauma counselling, so dangerous were the conditions they had to work in. Meanwhi.e, on the installations of the North Sea oilfields, the memory of the Piper Alpha disaster (a platform operated by US company, Occidental), which in 1989 killed 187 workers, still looms large. There are fears that continuous cost-cutting by the oil companies create the risk of another similar tragedy.

Memorial to the victoms of the Piper Alpha disaster (Blowout)

In all BP's largest three pipelines – FPS (UK), TAPS (US) and the OCENSA system (Colombia) – despite national legislation to protect trade union rights, BP and its partners have fought hard against recognition of unions, and routinely intimidated workers, especially when they point out safety problems. Given the restrictions on trade unions in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, and a lack of freedom of expression, who will protect and speak up about the pipeline system workers' rights to a safe working environment? How likely is it that abuses would be reported in the press? How accurate and honest is the leaflet prepared for communities in Azerbaijan when it states: "BP puts safety before profit and is therefore serious about this issue"?

What would be the impact of the AGT pipelines system on climate change?

The 365 million barrels of oil and 730 million cubic metres of gas that would pass through the AGT system each year, if it goes ahead, would, once burnt, contribute about 170 million tonnes of carbon dioxide to the Earth's atmosphere. As BP and others recognise, the AGT pipelines system is the key to unlocking the vast majority of the Caspian's oil and gas reserves. Consequently, it is also a vital part of an extensive industrial machinery that extracts carbon from beneath the Earth's surface and transfers it into the atmosphere – the machinery in effect that assists and drives the process of climate change. If

built, AGT would contribute to disrupting the Earth's climate, producing floods, droughts, sea level rises, storms and all the attendant impacts on human communities that these cause such as the people of Bangladesh, Honduras and Mozambique have experienced in recent years .

If built, AGT would be an actor in climate change. Surely ERM should consider this most global of impacts in their ESIA of the pipelines? Yet there is no mention of it in the leaflet of possible concerns they have distributed to local people.

Turkish coast, just west of Ceyhan/ Yumurtalik marine export terminal, where the BTC pipeline would end (Greg Muttitt, PLATFORM)

Our Common Concerns

The leaflet distributed by ERM to local communities in Azerbaijan along the planned AGT route invites comment on the proposed pipelines system. Given how much has been left unsaid by BP, communities might consider asking BP the following:

- *Would the project be safe? Other BP pipeline systems have often been far from safe over several decades. Why does BP believe that AGT should be any different from its previous pipelines?*
- *Even if the pipelines are built to the highest international standards, would these ever be sufficient to ensure safety? For example, has the risk of bomb attacks against the pipelines been fully evaluated? If so, what is the balance of priority between the safety of the oil (to get it to market) and the safety of communities along the route?*
- *Would the AGT pipelines system be safe in relation to the global atmosphere? Has BP assessed the lifetime impact of the pipelines system on climate change?*
- *Should a project with these risks and likely impacts be supported by public money? In what sense is it in the 'public interest' – either in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, or in the USA and Europe where taxpayers would subsidise it? Or for the publics around the world, those who suffer the impacts of climate change?*
- *Would AGT bring development to local communities in the long-term? Would local communities receive oil, gas and electricity supplies as requested? Or would they just dream of the oil and gas flowing under and close to their houses without receiving any direct benefit from the resources that ultimately belong to them?*
- *If the project proceeds as planned, and the kinds of environmental and social impacts that have been observed on other pipeline systems do take place, who will be held responsible? Are all those currently making decisions – in companies, governments, contractors and other organisations – on the future of AGT prepared to take responsibility for these eventualities? Are they fully aware of the responsibilities they are taking on?*